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Heinrich's idea of abstract labour.
Paul Cockshott
I have been reading Heinrich's 'An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl
Marx's Capital'. I decided to read it after I was told that this was probably the
most inﬂuential work published by what are termed the 'value form' theorists.
Up until this point I had known of Heinrich only by his participation on the
OPE-L mailing list, a list for people interested in Marxian political economy.
There have over the years been a number of debates on that list about value
form theory, though Heinrich himself was not one of the main contributors.
During an interview last week I was asked the question:
Currently Heinrich and other value theorists are enjoying a cer-
tain popularity in socialist circles. What do you think of value theory
as put forward by Heinrich?
My answer1 was criticised as being a rather brief and oﬀ the cuﬀ response to
a signiﬁcant and inﬂuential writer like Heinrich, so I promised to write a more
considered response.
On getting Heinrich's book I was immediately struck by how clear and well
written it was, and it could be very useful to people who come to read Capital for
1
I am more familiar with the English and American value form theorists than
Heinrich but I feel that value form theory concedes rather much to contemporary
economics and attributes more power to the market in creating value than is
realistic. My unhappiness with their approach is that they overload the meaning
of socially necessary labour in such a way that, were their meaning to be used,
they would make the labour theory of value unscientiﬁc.
From discussions with them, it seems to me that they hold that it is the sale
of commodities at a given price that establishes the social necessity of the labour
embodied in them. But if that is the case then there is no independent way of
checking whether the price of commodities is determined by their labour content.
They end up with a theory in which it is prices that determine what they count
as labour content, and you end up with a price theory of labour rather than a
labour theory of value. For a scientiﬁc theory of causality to be of any use, if we
say A causes B, then A and B must be independently measurable. If you can
only measure A by measuring B, then the inference that A even exists becomes
unnecessary, which of course was Samuelson's objection to the labour theory of
value.
The econophysics approach is that both A (labour content) and B (money
ﬂow from sales of output) are in fact empirically measurable, and that we can
show that variations in B are caused by variations in A.
See http://spiritofcontradiction.eu/rowan-duﬀy/2013/02/06/interview-paul-cockshott-on-
econophysics-and-socialism
1
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the ﬁrst time. But at the same time, the reader has to be aware that Heinrich is
presenting a special and somewhat controversial interpretation of Marx. I soon
saw that many of the issues that have been discussed at length by Marx scholars
on the OPE-L list are addressed here, and that in addressing these Heinrich very
deﬁnitely situates himself within one particular school of interpretation of Marx.
One might pass over this, after all, why bother neophytes with the arcana of
scholars, were it not for the fact that Heinrich himself emphasises this particular
interpretation of Marx as being a matter of great import.
In a nutshell my objection to Heinrich's interpretation is that if we follow it,
we end up with something which is no longer a scientiﬁc theory of capitalism,
whereas a slightly diﬀerent interpretation gives a strong and testable scientiﬁc
theory.
Heinrich claims that from the late 19th century until the 1960s understanding
of Marx was dominated by what he terms a 'world view' interpretation which he
sees as having been an essentially apologetic adaptation to the needs of political
parties. In the 60s
Now a far-reaching discussion of Marx's critique of political economy
emerged. The writings of Louis Althusser and his associates were
very inﬂuential in this regard (Althusser 1965, Althusser/Balibar
1965)2.
I concur with Heinrich in his assessment of much of the study of Capital dur-
ing the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, and with his point about the importance
of Althusser in starting a more detailed and critical engagement with Capital.
However there is a big diﬀerence between the approach of Althusser and that of
Heinrich. Althusser both in Reading Capital[2] and in his more recent writings[1]
was concerned to perform a critical analysis that distinguished between Marx's
scientiﬁc discoveries and the relicts of idealist philosophical language within
which these were at times expressed. Althusser was willing to interrogate the
silences and ambiguities that occur in parts of Marx's writing, ambiguities and
silences that, he claims, originate in the very real diﬃculty that Marx experi-
enced in breaking with pre-existing theoretical systems: classical political econ-
omy, Hegelian and Feuerbachian philosophy. This means that within Capital
there are diﬀerent conceptual systems that do not entirely mesh. There are,
Althusser says, concepts expressed that remain idealist and teleological.
1 Teleology
Heinrich is less critically incisive than Althusser and when he is faced with
texts in Capital, that modern science tells us are teleological nonsense, Heinrich
tends to accept them at face value. This is particularly clear when we look what
Heinrich says about the role of history in the order of exposition of Capital.
2 Heinrich, Michael; Locascio, Alex (2012-06-01). An Introduction to the Three Volumes
of Karl Marx's Capital (Kindle Locations 367-368). NYU Press. Kindle Edition.
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The notion that one must know history in order to understand
the present has a certain justiﬁcation when applied to the history
of events, but not for the structural history of a society. Rather,
the opposite is the case: to examine the constitution of a particular
social and economic structure, one has to be already familiar with
the completed structure. Only then will one know what to look for
in history. Marx formulated this idea with the help of a metaphor:
The anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape. On
the other hand, indications of higher forms in the lower species of
animals can only be understood when the higher forms themselves
are already known. (MECW, 28:42)
For this reason, the historical passages in Capital come after
the (theoretical) depictions of the corresponding categories and not
before...3
It staggers me that anyone writing recently so long after Darwin's great work
on human origins[5] could quote that passage from Marx in such an uncritical
way. What on earth does it mean to say that you can only understand 'lower'
forms of animal if you already understand 'higher' forms?
Biologists now don't accept the idea of higher and lower forms, the whole
notion is part of a mix of anthropocentric and racist 19th century ideas accord-
ing to which there is a great chain of being[6] going from protozoans at the
lowest link to white men at the highest link. It is inherently teleological since
it only makes sense if you think that the world is imbued with some divine
purpose whose end is to produce humanity. That Marx, who admired Darwin
should have written such teleological nonsense is, I was going to say inexcusable,
but it would be better to say it is a testament to the enduring strength of an
idealist ideological upbringing. It completely reverses the real causal relation
in evolution. Evolution works by the inheritance and modiﬁcation of acquired
characteristics. That humans give birth to live young rather than lay eggs has
to be understood in terms of the split between our ancestors (Theria) and the
ancestors of the Platypus (Prototheria)[7, Chapter 18.]. The key to our bearing
live young, is this retained character. The primal therian did not acquire this
trait in order to ultimately give rise to humans but because of unknown selective
pressures in the distant past.
If Marx's aphorism is evolutionary nonsense what is the justiﬁcation for
Heinrich taking it as a good guide to understand history?
He is concerned that we shall 'know what to look for in history', but this
is to write history in what Althusser called the future anterior tense: to read
back onto the past a purpose, the creation of the world as we know it today.
In Capital, Marx describes primitive accumulation, which is what he calls the
3
Heinrich, Michael; Locascio, Alex (2012-06-01). An Introduction to the Three
Volumes of Karl Marx's Capital (Kindle Locations 416-423). NYU Press. Kindle
Edition.
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historical process by which the peasantry in Britain were deprived of their lands
and turned into proletarians. Marx was concerned to explain how one of the key
elements of the capitalist economy came into being. Within the new economic
system, wage labour provided the basis for capitalist proﬁt. But the objec-
tive of the Tudor landowners who launched the enclosures was not to create
an industrial proletariat, it was to get land to graze their sheep. It is only the
accident of history that threw together a proletariat and a class with money,
and the absence of slavery in England that made this a precondition for capi-
talism. Proletariats have been formed before, and moneyed classes have existed
simultaneously before[8]. We have to recognise that the combination of elements
that later became parts of the capitalist system have a history of their own, it
is as mistaken to take the modern working class as the 'key' to understanding
the displaced peasants of the 16th century as it is to interpret the hand of the
chimp in terms of it being a precursor of our tool making hand. The ape's hand
arose as an adaptation for swinging through trees, the displace peasants of the
Tudor era were there as result of the struggle between them and the landowning
class.
2 Proof
Heinrich quotes with approval Marx's letter to Kugelmann to the eﬀect that
it is not necessary to give a proof of the labour theory of value. Given the
historical context, which Heinrich points out, one in which the labour theory
of value was generally accepted by political economists, Marx's assumption was
probably justiﬁed back then. But for Heinrich's present readers the situation is
very diﬀerent.
After Marx published Capital, the labour theory of value became a political
hot potato, something that the working class movement was using to justify its
demands for a socialist economy. In the years that followed there was a radical
rewriting of economic theory which eﬀectively eliminated the labour theory of
value from most economic text books. Among orthodox economists, the labour
theory of value is now regarded as something totally archaic and discredited, so
a contemporary reader of Capital can not rely on a general and tacit acceptance
that values were regulated by labour time. The question: 'how do we know that
labour is really the source of value' is now much more relevant. In the light
of modern skepticism, how adequate is the argument advanced in the letter to
Kugelmann?
The chatter about the need to prove the concept of value arises
only from complete ignorance both of the subject under discussion
and of the method of science. Every child knows that any nation
that stopped working, not for a year, but let us say, just for a few
weeks, would perish. And every child knows, too, that the amounts
of products corresponding to the diﬀering amounts of needs demand
diﬀering and quantitatively determined amounts of society's aggre-
gate labour. It is self-evident that this necessity of the distribution
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of social labour in speciﬁc proportions is certainly not abolished by
the speciﬁc form of social production; it can only change its form of
manifestation. Natural laws cannot be abolished at all. The only
thing that can change, under historically diﬀering conditions, is the
form in which those laws assert themselves. And the form in which
this proportional distribution of labour asserts itself in a state of
society in which the interconnection of social labour expresses it-
self as the private exchange of the individual products of labour, is
precisely the exchange value of these products. (MECW, 43:68)
Now this little passage is very interesting, and later on I will argue that it casts
doubt on Heinrich's own theory of value, but for now I am going to concentrate
on whether this is really an adequate defense of the labour theory of value.
How do we know that it is labour that regulates exchange value rather than
something else?
Heinrich reproduces Adam Smith's argument that usefulness can not be the
basis of value, but usefulness is not the only candidate. How can we tell that it
is not some other input to the production process that is key?
If we restrict ourselves, as Heinrich does, to considering prices in a capitalist
economy there are other possible value substances.
The establishment of capitalist industry went hand in hand with the devel-
opment of artiﬁcial sources of power: coal then oil. We also all know that in
today's world the owners of oilﬁelds are fabulously wealthy, so might energy not
be the source of value?
This is not an arbitrary selection on my part. The Technocracy Movement
advocated what was essentially an energy theory of value.
One could go through the passage from Marx above and wherever there is a
reference to labour substitute energy or power and the essence of the argument
would be unchanged. Any society deprived of energy sources would certainly
perish. The available energy supply must be distributed between diﬀerent po-
tential uses whatever the social organisation. The dependence of humanity on
energy is a natural law that can not be altered, etc.
But if that is the case how can we be sure that Marx is right and the
technocracy theorists are wrong?
If one adopts the normal method of science, the answer is simple. You see
what price structure would be predicted by the labour theory of value, what
price structure would be predicted by the energy theory of value, and see which
theory gives the better predictions. Such tests have been done[4], and they show
that actual prices correspond much more closely to what the labour theory of
value predicts than to what the energy theory predicts. But as we will see in
the next section Heinrich's approach prohibits this sort of scientiﬁc test.
3 What is abstract labour
It is common ground to all Marxist economists that Marx held abstract socially
necessary labour to be the source of value. But what is abstract labour?
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Is it the simple expenditure of human physiological energy?
Marx uses this formulation when trying to explain abstract labour:
Tailoring and weaving, though qualitatively diﬀerent produc-
tive activities, are each a productive expenditure of human brains,
nerves, and muscles, and in this sense are human labour. They
are but two diﬀerent modes of expending human labour-power. Of
course, this labour-power, which remains the same under all its mod-
iﬁcations, must have attained a certain pitch of development before
it can be expended in a multiplicity of modes. But the value of a
commodity represents human labour in the abstract, the expendi-
ture of human labour in general. (Capital Vol 1, page 12 of the
Marxist Internet Archive pdf ﬁle)
On the one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an ex-
penditure of human labour-power, and in its character of identical
abstract human labour, it creates and forms the value of commodi-
ties. On the other hand, all labour is the expenditure of human
labour-power in a special form and with a deﬁnite aim, and in this,
its character of concrete useful labour, it produces use-values. (Cap-
ital Vol 1, page 12 of the Marxist Internet Archive pdf ﬁle)
Heinrich rejects this formulation because :
The reduction of various types of labor to labor in a physiological
sense, however, is a purely mental abstraction, to which any kind of
labor can be subjected, regardless of whether it produces a commod-
ity. Furthermore, this formulation suggests that abstract labor has
a completely non-social, natural foundation, and has therefore ac-
cordingly provoked naturalistic interpretations of abstract labor4.
Well that is begging the question. It is only an objection if you assume from
the start that abstract labour does not exist except in capitalist society.
But Marx has another explanation for what abstract labour is, based on the
division of labour.
So far as they are values, the coat and the linen are things of a like
substance, objective expressions of essentially identical labour. But
tailoring and weaving are, qualitatively, diﬀerent kinds of labour.
There are, however, states of society in which one and the same man
does tailoring and weaving alternately, in which case these two forms
of labour are mere modiﬁcations of the labour of the same individual,
and no special and ﬁxed functions of diﬀerent persons, just as the
coat which our tailor makes one day, and the trousers which he makes
another day, imply only a variation in the labour of one and the
same individual. Moreover, we see at a glance that, in our capitalist
4 Heinrich, Michael; Locascio, Alex (2012-06-01). An Introduction to the Three Volumes
of Karl Marx's Capital (Kindle Locations 742-745). NYU Press. Kindle Edition. 1:137).
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society, a given portion of human labour is, in accordance with the
varying demand, at one time supplied in the form of tailoring, at
another in the form of weaving. This change may possibly not take
place without friction, but take place it must.(Capital Vol 1, page
12 of the Marxist Internet Archive pdf ﬁle)
In this formulation - which Heinrich ignores - labour is abstract as part of
the pool of human labour available to society. Workers can change occupation,
either from day to day, or at diﬀerent points in their life time. Insofar as they can
potentially move from one activity to another their ability to work is abstract.
This is most obvious with an unemployed person. They have an abstract ability
to work in a variety of diﬀerent jobs, until they get a job, this abstract ability
to work does not take a concrete form.
Go back to the quote from Marx's letter to Kugelmann where he says It
is self-evident that this necessity of the distribution of social labour in speciﬁc
proportions is certainly not abolished by the speciﬁc form of social production;
it can only change its form of manifestation. What is the social labour that is
being distributed?
Clearly it is abstract labour. It is only after social labour has been dis-
tributed into diﬀerent activities that it takes on a concrete form.
So abstract labour is the abstract expenditure of human physiological eﬀort
and society has only a certain amount of this eﬀort available to it which can be
expended in diﬀerent concrete forms.
This concept is indeed 'naturalistic' and 'a-historical'. It is naturalistic in
that it depends on our adaptability as a species, our ability to turn our hand
to any task. It is a-historical in that any society with a division of labour has
abstract labour. Back to the letter to Kugelmann : It is self-evident that this
necessity of the distribution of social labour in speciﬁc proportions is certainly
not abolished by the speciﬁc form of social production; it can only change its
form of manifestation. Natural laws cannot be abolished at all. The only thing
that can change, under historically diﬀering conditions, is the form in which
those laws assert themselves. One can scarcely have a more explicit assertion
of the natural and a-historical basis of abstract labour than that.
Heinrich however presents a quite diﬀerent interpretation of abstract labour
one that he founds on his concept of real as opposed to mental abstractions.
Let us deal with abstract labor in more detail. Abstract labor
is not visible, only a particular concrete labor is visible, just as the
concept of tree isn't visible: I'm only capable of perceiving a con-
crete botanical plant. As with the term tree, abstract labor is
an abstraction, but a completely diﬀerent kind of abstraction. Nor-
mally, abstractions are constituted in human thought. We refer to
the commonalities among individual examples and then establish an
abstract category, such as tree. But in the case of abstract labor,
we are not dealing with such a mental abstraction but with a real
abstraction, by which we mean an abstraction that is carried out in
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the actual behavior of humans, regardless of whether they are aware
of it5.
Heinrich here shows a rather archaic understanding of abstraction in biology.
Biology is well aware of the diﬀerence between conventional and real abstract
categories. Taxonomy attempts to discover the real abstract categories into
which organisms are organised. Let us consider plant categories. Initially the
gymnosperms and angiosperms were categorised just on the basis of a common
traits in seed morphology. Subsequently after the development of evolutionary
theory and genetics it came to be realised that these are actually real categories
based on common descent and shared genes.
According to Heinrich abstract labour is a real abstraction. That is not a
problem, if we take the physiological approach to abstract labour. The expen-
diture of human physiological energy is real. We can measure it by monitoring
a person's oxygen consumption whilst they perform diﬀerent tasks. Nor is the
insistence on real abstraction a problem if we take Marx's other explanation of
abstract labour - that abstract labour is a property of the division of labour,
since real people do move between concrete jobs. A person's ability to change
jobs is not a mere mental abstraction.
But for Heinrich the 'real abstraction' is what occurs when commodities are
exchanged.
it is exchange, that consummates the abstraction that under-
lies abstract labor (independent of whether the people engaged in
exchange are aware of this abstraction). But then abstract labor
cannot be measured in terms of hours of labor: every hour of labor
measured by a clock is an hour of a particular concrete act of la-
bor, expended by a particular individual, regardless of whether the
product is exchanged. Abstract labor, on the other hand, cannot be
expended at all. Abstract labor is a relation of social validation
(Geltungsverhältnis) that is constituted in exchange.6
What we have here is a set of rather weak arguments that lead up to his real
purpose of reinstalling a theory of supply and demand as the basis of value.
Abstract labour can not be measured in hours?
Well what do management tools like timesheets and time and motion studies
do?
They measure the amount of time required to perform a task. Take an
average across enough workers and you get a measure of the socially necessary
labour required to do that task. It becomes abstract as soon as you add together
5
Heinrich, Michael; Locascio, Alex (2012-06-01). An Introduction to the Three
Volumes of Karl Marx's Capital (Kindle Locations 730-735). NYU Press. Kindle
Edition.
6 Heinrich, Michael; Locascio, Alex (2012-06-01). An Introduction to the Three Volumes
of Karl Marx's Capital (Kindle Locations 749-753). NYU Press. Kindle Edition
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the time required to do several diﬀerent tasks in order to get an estimate of the
labour required for an entire project. The fact that the diﬀerent labour times
that you add together were all diﬀerent concrete activities is no more a problem
than other forms of measurement. If you weigh things on a scale you are always
measuring weights of concrete things, ﬂour, sugar etc. But you can add these
together and get a weight in the abstract of a whole load that you are putting
into a truck for example.
Of course abstract labour can be expended. If one concluded that abstract
labour can not be expended, you would have to conclude the same about what
electrical energy?
Electrical energy is always expended doing something concrete: turning a
motor, heating an oven, providing light, but that does not make electrical energy
in the abstract, measured in kilowatt hours, any less real. Measure current at
your meter and you abstract from the concrete tasks the electricity performs
Yes human abstract labour is always expended doing something concrete,
but measure it at the entrance, count the people going into a workplace and
you measure the labour in the abstract used by that workplace.
But this all leads up to the grand idea of value form theory: that abstract
social labour is constituted by the act of exchange.
In exchange, the concrete acts of expended labor count as a par-
ticular quantum of value-constituting abstract labor, or are valid as
a speciﬁc quantum of abstract labor,7
. Heinrich is opposed to the idea that Marx supported the labour theory of
value and holds that instead he had a monetary theory of value. Heinrich's
interpretation of socially necessary labour time is that:
1. Labour must be technically necessary: ie, take place under average tech-
nical conditions that neither over or under-use labour.
2. Labour must be socially necessary in the sense that there must be suﬃcient
monetary demand for the total output to be sold.
Only labor-time expended under the average existing conditions
of production as well as for the satisfaction of monetary social de-
mand constitutes value. To what extent the privately expended
labor was actually necessary to satisfy demand depends on the one
hand upon the amount of this demand and on the other hand upon
the volume of production of other producersboth of which ﬁrst
become apparent in exchange8.
This is in a sense a pun upon two meanings of the word necessary, and it is
unfortunately a pun that Marx himself used at a few points. But at other
7 Heinrich, Michael; Locascio, Alex (2012-06-01). An Introduction to the Three Volumes
of Karl Marx's Capital (Kindle Locations 753-755). NYU Press. Kindle Edition
8 Heinrich, Michael; Locascio, Alex (2012-06-01). An Introduction to the Three Volumes
of Karl Marx's Capital (Kindle Locations 768-771). NYU Press. Kindle Edition.
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places Marx talks of commodities selling above or below their value - something
that would be meaningless if value was constituted in the process of exchange.
More seriously, if one puns like this, one removes from one voids the theory of
value of any scientiﬁc status. Let us look at both of these in turn.
Marx discusses whether prices will correspond or not to values and introduces
the idea of market-value as distinct from individual value:
For prices at which commodities are exchanged to approximately
correspond to their values, nothing more is necessary than 1) for the
exchange of the various commodities to cease being purely acciden-
tal or only occasional; 2) so far as direct exchange of commodities
is concerned, for these commodities to be produced on both sides
in approximately suﬃcient quantities to meet mutual requirements,
something learned from mutual experience in trading and therefore
a natural outgrowth of continued trading; and 3) so far as selling is
concerned, for no natural or artiﬁcial monopoly to enable either of
the contracting sides to sell commodities above their value or to com-
pel them to undersell. By accidental monopoly we mean a monopoly
which a buyer or seller acquires through an accidental state of supply
and demand.
The assumption that the commodities of the various spheres of
production are sold at their value merely implies, of course, that
their value is the centre of gravity around which their prices ﬂuctu-
ate, and their continual rises and drops tend to equalise. There is
also the market-value  of which later  to be distinguished from
the individual value of particular commodities produced by diﬀerent
producers. The individual value of some of these commodities will
be below their market-value (that is, less labour time is required for
their production than expressed is the market value) while that of
others will exceed the market-value. On the one hand, market-value
is to be viewed as the average value of commodities produced in
a single sphere, and, on the other, as the individual value of the
commodities produced under average conditions of their respective
sphere and forming the bulk of the products of that sphere. .(Karl
Marx, Capital vol III, page 128-129 Marxist Internet Archive pdf
ﬁle).
Here he is deﬁning market value in terms of Heinrich's ﬁrst condition, but he
distinguishes prices from values and says that value are the center of gravity
around which prices ﬂuctuate. This is incompatible with the idea that monetary
demand itself is constitutive of value.
Nothing is easier than to realise the inconsistencies of demand
and supply, and the resulting deviation of market-prices from market-
values. The real diﬃculty consists in determining what is meant by
the equation of supply and demand.
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Supply and demand coincide when their mutual proportions are
such that the mass of commodities of a deﬁnite line of production
can be sold at their market-value, neither above nor below it. That
is the ﬁrst thing we hear.
The second is this: If commodities are sold at their market-
values, supply and demand coincide.
If supply equals demand, they cease to act, and for this very
reason commodities are sold at their market-values. Whenever two
forces operate equally in opposite directions, they balance one an-
other, exert no outside inﬂuence, and any phenomena taking place
in these circumstances must be explained by causes other than the
eﬀect of these two forces. If supply and demand balance one an-
other, they cease to explain anything, do not aﬀect market-values,
and therefore leave us so much more in the dark about the reasons
why the market-value is expressed in just this sum of money and no
other.
On the one hand, the relation of demand and supply, therefore,
only explains the deviations of market-prices from market-values.
On the other, it explains the tendency to eliminate these deviations,
i.e., to eliminate the eﬀect of the relation of demand and supply.(Karl
Marx, Capital vol III, page 135 Marxist Internet Archive pdf ﬁle).
You can readily ﬁnd other passages where Marx talks about prices rising above
or below their value9. What are we then to make of the short passage on which
Heinrich rests his interpretation10?
There are two aspects of this,
1. A judgment as to what Marx himself thought.
2. A judgment as to which view of value is more scientiﬁc.
The ﬁrst is ultimately undecidable. To play devil's advocate, one could say
that Volume 3 of Capital was not readied for publication by Marx and did not
represent his considered opinion, whereas the quote in footnote 10 might be his
last word on the subject, and he might have inwardly repudiated all he said
about prices being above or below value in Volume 3. On the other hand, since
he is so scathing of economists who seek to explain prices in terms of prices,
rather than in terms of labour - something outside of the exchange process, this
seems far fetched. In that case one has only to make a closer reading of the
passage that Heinrich relies upon. Yes, if there is an excess supply of cloth then
9 For example in Chapter VI of Value Price and Proﬁt.
10 suppose that every piece of linen in the market contains no more labour-time than is
socially necessary. In spite of this, all these pieces taken as a whole, may have had superﬂuous
labour-time spent upon them. If the market cannot stomach the whole quantity at the normal
price of 2 shillings a yard, this proves that too great a portion of the total labour of the
community has been expended in the form of weaving. The eﬀect is the same as if each
individual weaver had expended more labour-time upon his particular product than is socially
necessary. ( Capital I, page 72 Marxist Internet Archive pdf ﬁle).
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the eﬀect is the same as if each individual weaver had spent more labour time
than was socially necessary. The eﬀect is that each weaver sees a price that is
less than the labour he expended. But this eﬀect is quite compatible with the
notion of prices falling below values that Marx uses elsewhere in his writing. It
does not require a redeﬁnition, or 'new reading' of value itself.
On the other hand there is no doubt that were we to accept Heinrich's
reading we would have to abandon any claim that Marxian analysis of value
was scientiﬁc. Science rests on the testability of its propositions and has to
be wary of hypothesising causal entities which are in principle unmeasurable.
If we say with Heinrich that the labour time that creates value can not be
independently measured, can only be inferred from the price at which things
sell, then you no longer have a testable theory. There is nothing to distinguish
it scientiﬁcally from a theory that says that it is electricity that is the source of
value, but not the common vulgar electricity measured by meters, instead value
is determined by social electricity. And how do we measure how much social
electricity a commodity contains?
Simple! We just look at its price and divide through by the Monetary Equiv-
alent of Electricity.
Heinrich's theory of value is operationally indistinguishable from a social
electricity theory, or from any number of 'New Age' theories. Consider the
following advocacy of complementary medicine:
At the root of most holistic therapies lies the belief that all life
is animated by a subtle force. We call this the Life Force. You
either believe it or you do not. It cannot exactly be proved at the
moment and the belief is not in accord with the yardsticks that we
call 'scientiﬁc', The belief is a little akin to the belief in God or in
spirits or ghosts, and yet at the same time it is not, because the Life
Force is by no means so remote from us. It is not necessarily diﬃcult
for an agnostic to accept the Life Force. The writer was once asked
for a deﬁnition of the Life Force and wrote:
The Life Force is that non-material. non-physical
force that animates all life forms and distinguishes them
from non-living matter. It Is seen as a determining Force,
not as a mere accompaniment to the phenomenon of Life.
That is, it determines whether Life can exist or not. It
determines the physical form that a life form takes: by its
quality and its strength it determines the health, vigour
and vitality of the life form. Hence it determines our free-
dom from, or our susceptibility to illnesses, and our gen-
eral ability to come through and to recover from Life's
stresses and traumas.
I do not want to embarrass the University from whose prospectus this came,
but I think any Marxist is likely to be dismissive of such stuﬀ. But ask yourself,
what is the diﬀerence between the immaterial, unmeasurable 'abstract labour'
of Heinrich and the 'life force' of holistic therapists?
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If we stick to the conventional interpretation of Marx's theory of value we
have something which is not only scientiﬁcally testable, but has been scientiﬁ-
cally tested and found correct[3].
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